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Stretching ¯rm and brand reputation
Lu¶³s M B Cabral
¤
Abstract. I consider an adverse selection model of ¯rm reputation. Each ¯rm is characterized by an
exogenously given quality level, which is the ¯rm's private information and applies to any product
it sells. Consumers observe the performance of the ¯rm's products, which is positively related to
the ¯rm's quality level. The ¯rm's reputation is given by the consumers' posterior on the ¯rm's
quality level given the ¯rm's performance history. I address the following question: if a ¯rm is to
launch a new product, should it use the same name as its base product (reputation stretching), or
should it create a new name (and start a new reputation history)? I show that, for a given level
of reputation, ¯rms stretch if and only if quality is su±ciently high. As a consequence, stretching
signals high quality. If the new product is relatively pro¯table compared to the base product,
then, for a given level of quality, ¯rms stretch if and only if reputation is high (i.e., ¯rms exploit
good reputations). Conversely, if the new product is relatively unpro¯table compared to the base
product, then, for a given level of quality, ¯rms stretch if and only if reputation is low (i.e., ¯rms
protect good reputations).
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1. Introduction
Canon established its reputation as a maker of photographic cameras. In the mid 1970s, it entered
into the market for photocopiers, a related but di®erent product, selling its new o®ering under the
same brand name. Was this a good move by Canon? One justi¯cation for Canon's strategy is that
creating new brand names is costly, so that using the same name saves part of the cost of launching
a new product (Tauber, 1988).
A di®erent approach|the one I follow in this paper|is to look at the ¯rm's decision as an
informational problem.
1
Continuing with the same example, Canon enjoys a reputation for product
quality as a result of its good track record in selling cameras. Since what it takes to produce a good
camera is similar to what it takes to produce a good photocopier, consumers should expect the
quality of a Canon photocopier to be approximately at the level of Canon cameras. In this context,
by adding a photocopier to its product portfolio, Canon uses its reputation to pro¯t from the sale
of the new product. Naturally, if the photocopier turns out to be of poor quality (or perceived as
such), then the reputation of the Canon brand su®ers. In other words, Canon risks squandering its
reputation.
My purpose in this paper is to analyze these trade-o®s in a framework of optimal ¯rm strategy
and rational consumer behavior. I develop a simple adverse selection model, derive its equilibrium,
and characterize the main informational e®ects involved in the decision of stretching a reputation.
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In the model, each ¯rm is characterized by an exogenously given quality level, which is the ¯rm's
private information and applies to any product it supplies. Consumers observe the performance of
the ¯rm's products, which is related to the ¯rm's quality level. In this context, reputation is the
consumers' posterior on the ¯rm's quality level given the ¯rm's performance history.
I consider three e®ects in the decision to stretch a reputation. First, a ¯rm's reputation from
its base product in°uences the consumers' willingness to pay for a new product sold under the
same name (and for additional sales of the base product); I call this the direct reputation e®ect.
Second, the performance of the new product, if sold under the same name, in°uences the consumers'
willingness to pay for future sales of the base product; I call this the feed-back reputation e®ect.
Finally, insofar as the decision to stretch is related to the ¯rm's quality, the simple fact that a ¯rm
uses the same name to launch a second product in°uences the consumers' willingness to pay for
the new product (and for additional sales of the base product); I call this the signaling e®ect.
The feed-back reputation e®ect implies that higher-quality ¯rms are more con¯dent that stretch-
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ing will consolidate their reputation. As a result, for a given reputation level, the ¯rms that stretch
their reputation are the ¯rms of higher quality level. The direct reputation e®ect is of ambiguous
sign. If the new product is very pro¯table compared to the base product, then ¯rms will \exploit"
their reputation, so that, for a given level of quality, stretching takes place if and only if reputation
is su±ciently high. If however the new product is of marginal importance with respect to the base
product, then ¯rms will only stretch if reputation is su±ciently low, in an attempt to \build" their
reputation; by contrast, when reputation is high, ¯rms prefer to \protect" their reputation.
In addition to these basic results, I also derive empirical implications of the model's assumptions
and results. Some correspond to existing empirical work, some to possible statistical tests that
relate reputation, performance and the decision to stretch. Finally, I consider a number of possible
extensions of the model, including the endogenous decision of whether to launch a new product
and the choice of which product to stretch to.
The economic analysis (and the economics literature) on reputation stretching can be divided
according to the nature of the branding e®ects it is based upon. Brand names can be vehicles of
reputation in two ways: they may incorporate information about the ¯rm's actions or information
about ¯rm characteristics.
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When the ¯rm's actions are not observable (moral hazard), reputation
corresponds to an implicit contract between seller and buyers whereby the former supplies high-
quality experience goods and the latter pay a high price | until the seller cheats on buyers and
reputation breaks down. The seminal economics papers on this approach are Telser (1980), Klein
and Le²er (1981), and Shapiro (1983). Kreps (1990) put forward the idea of the ¯rm's name (or
the ¯rm's brand name) as the carrier of reputation, in the context of moral hazard. Finally, the
strategy of brand stretching in this context is explored in Choi (1998).
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An alternative information-based approach to brand e®ects is that of adverse selection. Suppose
that quality is a ¯rm attribute which consumers cannot observe ex-ante. In this context, reputation
corresponds to the consumers' posterior beliefs regarding ¯rm quality. Such beliefs are updated
based on the observation of the ¯rm's past performance as well as on other actions by the ¯rm that
might signal its private information. The basic framework for the analysis of this type of reputation
was laid down in Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps and Wilson (1982). The idea of names
as carriers of reputation (in the context of adverse selection) was explored by Tadelis (1999), who
considers a model where names are traded. Finally, the strategy of brand stretching in an adverse
selection context was proposed by Wernerfelt (1988).
My approach is one of adverse selection. Speci¯cally, I develop a model that shares some of
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the features of Tadelis' (1999) basic framework, though I look at a di®erent set of issues: whereas
Tadelis (1999) examines the equilibrium in the market for names, assuming that each product is
sold under a di®erent name, I consider the case when names are not traded but can be used to
sell more than one product. The problem I consider is the same as in Wernerfelt (1988), though
the approach I take is somewhat di®erent: in Wernerfelt (1988), brand stretching signals quality
because stretching is more costly than creating a new name, whereas I assume that brand stretching
is cost neutral.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, I present the basic model and derive its
Bayesian equilibria. In Sections 4 and 5, I discuss the equilibrium stretching strategy and analyze
the particular case when utility is linear and both quality and performance are normally distributed.
The empirical implications of the model are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 suggests a number of
extensions of the basic framework.
2. Model
I consider an economy with overlapping generations of ¯rms. In each period, a ¯xed measure of
new ¯rms is born. Each ¯rm is endowed with a basic product and lives for three periods (ages
0,1,2). The ¯rm sells 1¡ ± units of the basic product at ages 0 and 2.
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A countable (i.e., measure
zero) set of ¯rms is endowed with a second product at age 1, of which it sells ± units (± 2 [0; 1]).
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The ¯rm's main decision is whether to sell its second product under the same name as the ¯rst one
or under a di®erent name. Each ¯rm is endowed with quality q, which only the ¯rm can observe.
The ¯rm's second product (if it exists) is of the same quality as the ¯rst one, a fact that is common
knowledge to ¯rm and consumers.
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Notice that payo®s are paramaterized by the value of ±, which
measures the relative importance of the new product with respect to the base product. If ± is close
to 1, then most pro¯ts are coming from the new product; if ± is close to zero, then most pro¯ts
come from the base product.
A product's performance in period t, r
t
2 [r; r], is related to its quality, q 2 [q; q], according
to the cdf F (rjq) (density f). Conditional on quality, product performance is i.i.d. across periods.
Moreover, product performance is public information.
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Consumers derive utility u(r) from the
product's performance, where u(r) is strictly increasing in r. It follows that v(q) =
R
r
r
u(r) dF (rjq)
is the consumers' willingness to pay for a product of quality q. Consumers do not directly observe
q, however. They hold a (correct) prior G(q) (density g) and, based on information −, they form
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posterior beliefs H(qj−) (density h). It follows that, at each information set −, consumers are
willing to pay up to w(−) =
R
q
q
v(q) dH(qj−).
The consumers' information set includes past product performance and the observation that the
¯rm has stretched its reputation, if that is the case. I assume that consumers do not observe the
ownership of each brand. Consumers cannot therefore distinguish between a new product launched
by a new ¯rm and a new product launched by an old ¯rm.
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Speci¯cally, − =
°
/ for a new product;
− = fr
0
; sg for a ¯rm that stretches and at the time it does so; − = fr
0
; s; r
1
g at the beginning of
a ¯rm's third year, in case it stretches; and − = fr
0
g at the beginning of the ¯rm's third year, in
case it does not stretch.
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As mentioned above, the ¯rm's strategy consists of whether or not to stretch given that it is
endowed with a new product. This decision is based on the ¯rm's quality level q (which is the
¯rm's private information) as well as on the ¯rst-period product performance r
0
(which is public
information). Formally, I denote by x(q; r
0
) the probability that the ¯rm stretches its name to the
new product.
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Finally, I assume the market is short on the sellers' side and that consumers bid for each ¯rm's
output. It follows that each unit is sold for w(−), the consumers' willingness to pay.
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w(−) is also
¯rm pro¯t per unit in each period, since I assume production costs to be zero.
The timing of the model, from the point of view of a ¯rm that is endowed with two products,
is summarized in Table 1.
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The model's notation is summarized in Table 2.
I make the following assumption regarding the function F (rjq):
Assumption 1. f(rjq) > 0 for all q; r. The family of densities ff(¢jq)g has the strict monotone
likelihood ratio property (SMLRP), that is, if q
00
> q
0
then
f(rjq
00
)
f(rjq
0
)
is strictly increasing in r.
This assumption implies that higher-q ¯rms produce better products. In other words, it implies
that v(q) is increasing, that is, consumers would be willing to pay more for a higher-q ¯rm product.
Moreover, the assumption implies that higher performance is \good news" regarding the ¯rm's
quality (Milgrom, 1981). That is, the higher r
0
the better the posterior distribution of q, in the
sense of ¯rst-order stochastic dominance. Finally, notice that, in the ¯rst period, r
0
is a su±cient
indicator for the ¯rm's reputation level. For this reason, I will below refer to r
0
as the ¯rm's
reputation level.
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3. Equilibria
In this section, I derive the set of equilibria in the model, as well as the main features of each
equilibrium. The equilibrium concept I will use is that of Bayesian Equilibrium:
De¯nition 1. A Bayesian Equilibrium (BE) is a pair hx(q; r
0
);H(qj−)i such that (i) x(q; r
0
) is
optimal given H(qj−); (ii) H(qj−) is Bayesian consistent given x(q; r
0
).
In order to determine the ¯rm's optimal strategy, I need to compute the expected value from
launching the new product under the same name as the ¯rst product, S(q; r
0
), and compare it to
the payo® from using a new name, N(r
0
). The di®erence between the former and the latter is the
marginal payo® from stretching, M(q; r
0
). We then have
M(q; r
0
) ´ S(q; r
0
)¡N(r
0
)
S(q; r
0
) = ±w(r
0
; s) + (1¡ ±)
Z
r
r
w(r
0
; s; r
1
) dF (r
1
jq) (1)
N(r
0
) = ±w(
°
/) + (1¡ ±)w(r
0
);
where, as an abuse of notation, w(r
0
; s) denotes w(−) where − = fr
0
; sg, and so forth. In words,
N(r
0
) is the pro¯t from selling a new product under a new name, ±w(
°
/), plus the pro¯t from
selling the the base product for the second time, (1¡ ±)w(r
0
). S(q; r
0
) is the pro¯t from selling the
second product under the base product's name, ±w(r
0
; s), plus the expected pro¯t from selling the
base product for the second time, (1¡ ±)
R
r
r
w(r
0
; s; r
1
) dF (r
1
jq).
In order to obtain a BE, I impose that H(qj−) be consistent with Bayes' theorem. This implies
that
h(qj
°
/) = g(q)
h(qjr
0
) =
g(q) f(r
0
jq)
R
q
q
f(r
0
j~q) dG(~q)
h(qjr
0
; s) =
g(q) f(r
0
jq) x(q; r
0
)
R
q
q
f(r
0
j~q) x(~q; r
0
) dG(~q)
h(qjr
0
; s; r
1
) =
g(q) f(r
0
jq) f(r
1
jq) x(q; r
0
)
R
q
q
f(r
0
j~q) f(r
1
j~q) x(~q; r
0
) dG(~q)
: (2)
To understand these expressions, note that, although I focus on a particular ¯rm, the model assumes
overlapping generations of continuums of ¯rms, some of which (a measure zero) are endowed with
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a second product. So, for example, if consumers observe a product with no history they assume
that this is a new product, hence h(qj
°
/) = g(q). In fact, a new product could also be launched by
an old ¯rm, but this is a measure zero event.
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The ¯rst results in this section are the following. First, I show that there exists a pooling equi-
librium whereby ¯rms never stretch. Then I show there exists a unique semi-separating equilibrium
(in the sense that no complete pooling takes place for any value of r
0
).
Proposition 1 (pooling equilibrium). There exists a pooling equilibrium whereby no ¯rm ever sells
a second product under the same name: x(q; r
0
) = 0; 8q; r
0
.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 is a common result in signaling games. When there are zero-probability events,
Bayesian equilibria are consistent with any kind of beliefs. If we make those beliefs su±ciently
unfavorable to the ¯rst player, then we can support a pooling equilibrium. In the present case,
stretching is a zero-probability event. We can therefore associate such an event with the belief that
the ¯rm is of the lowest quality, thus making \no stretching" an equilibrium.
Next I consider an equlibrium where there is some separation.
Proposition 2 (semi-separating equilibrium). There exists a unique equilibrium such that, for all
r
0
, the probability of stretching is strictly positive. In this equilibrium, a ¯rm stretches with
probability one if and only if q > q
¤
(r
0
), and does not stretch otherwise. The probability of
stretching is therefore increasing in q.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The thrust of the proof of Proposition 2 is to show that the marginal payo® from stretching,
M(q; r
0
), is increasing in q. The implication is that, in equilibrium, it's the ¯rms with higher q
that stretch. The reason for this result is that the only part of the payo® function that depends
on q is expected future sales at age 2 in case of stretching; and Assumption 1 implies such payo®
is increasing in q.
Propositions 1 and 2 show that there exist two di®erent equilibria. However, there actually
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exists a continuum of equilibria. In fact, for each value of r
0
, I can select as equilibrium strategies
and beliefs either those in Proposition 1 or those in Proposition 2. This leads to a continuum
of possible combinations between the two. In the remainder of the paper, I will focus on the
semi-separating equilibrium of Proposition 2, the only equilibrium where stretching takes place
with positive probability for all values of r
0
. This is the only universally divine equilibrium.
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To be more rigorous, the equilibrium of Proposition 2 is the only universally divine equilibrium
in a discretized version of the game where there is a ¯nite number of types (which however can
be arbitrarily large). The reason is that, for any consumer belief, the payo® from stretching is
increasing in q (see the proof of Proposition 2). If follows that, at each round of the iterated
elimination process, the D2 criterion eliminates the lowest surviving type. This in turn eliminates
any equilibrium where all types pool at \no stretching."
Proposition 2 provides an answer to the question: Given a value of r
0
, how does the optimal
strategy depend on the value of q? Consumers do not observe q, only the performance levels r
0
and r
1
. By Assumption 1, higher-quality ¯rms expect higher values of r
1
; and higher values of r
1
increase the consumers' willingness to pay. It follows that the payo® from stretching is increasing
in q. This e®ect, which I denote by feed-back reputation e®ect, provides an answer to the question
above: for a given r
0
, it is the ¯rms with higher q that stretch.
The complementary question, in terms of characterizing the optimal ¯rm strategy, is the follow-
ing: Given a value of q, for what realizations of r
0
should a ¯rm stretch? This is a more complicated
question: higher levels of r
0
imply that the ¯rm can get more from selling a new product with the
same name as its base product; but it also means that the ¯rm has more to lose from squandering
its reputation. In other words, the direct reputation e®ect may cut both ways. My next result
states that, if the new product is relatively pro¯table, then ¯rms stretch when their reputation is
high.
Proposition 3 (reputation exploiting). For each r
0
, there exists a ± such that if ± > ± then q
¤
(r
0
) is
decreasing.
Proof. See the Appendix.
If ± is close to 1, then q
¤
(r
0
) is decreasing. If q
¤
(r
0
) is decreasing, then, for a given value of q,
¯rms stretch if and only if r
0
is greater than the inverse of q
¤
(r
0
). This is fairly intuitive: a high
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value of ± e®ectively implies that the ¯rm is only concerned with the sales of its new product. The
direct reputation e®ect then implies that higher reputation leads to higher bene¯ts from stretching.
In other words, the optimal strategy is one of reputation exploiting: use your brand name if and
only if it has value.
4. The linear-normal case
In order to get a better idea of the nature of the equilibrium, I now consider the particular case
when utility u(r) is linear and both q and r
t
are normally distributed. With no further loss of
generality, I assume that the ex-ante expected value of q is zero. Formally,
Assumption 2. u(r) is linear.
Assumption 3. (i) F (rjq) = N(q; ¾
r
); (ii) G(q) = N(0; ¾
q
).
Linearity of the utility function implies that consumers only care about expected performance.
Normality of the prior and the performance distributions allows for a simple solution to the updating
problem.
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Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium of Proposition 2 in the linear-normal example and for the
parameter values ¾
q
= ¾
r
= ± = 1.
17
As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, the equilibrium
strategy consists of a critical value q
¤
(r
0
) above which the ¯rm stretches. Figure 1 depicts the
equilibrium value q
¤
(r
0
) in the (r
0
; q) map. In order to get a better grasp of the e®ects at work,
the ¯gure also depicts the critical value, q
¤¤
(r
0
), corresponding to the case when consumers do not
include s in their updating of h(q), so that h(q) =
g(q) f(r
0
jq)
R
q
q
f(r
0
j~q)dG(~q)
and not h(q) =
g(q) f(r
0
jq) x(q;r
0
)
R
q
q
f(r
0
j~q) x(~q;r
0
)dG(~q)
,
as is the case in a Bayesian equilibrium; that is, the value q
¤¤
(r
0
) corresponds to the case when
consumers rationally process the information regarding performance (r
0
) but not the information
provided by the ¯rm's choice of whether or not to stretch (s).
The ¯rst thing to notice from Figure 1 is that q
¤¤
(r
0
) is decreasing. Speci¯cally, if ± =
1
=
2
then
q
¤¤
(r
0
) = ¡r
0
. To understand this fact, note that: (i) pro¯t at age 1 in case of stretching is equal
to pro¯t at age 2 in case of no stretching (in both cases consumers observe r
0
); (ii) pro¯t at age 1
in case of no stretching is zero (the pro¯t of a new product launched under a new name); (iii) it
follows that stretching is optimal if and only if pro¯t at age 2 in case of stretching is positive; (iv)
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since, by assumption, consumers do not process the information from the observation of s, age 2
pro¯t is proportional to r
0
+ r
1
; and the ¯rm's expected value of r
0
+ r
1
is r
0
+ q.
q > q
¤¤
(r
0
) cannot be an equilibrium, however. If that were the case and a ¯rm with low r
0
were
to stretch, then consumers should expect such ¯rm to be of very high quality (q > ¡r
0
in the case
when ± =
1
=
2
); accordingly, consumers would be willing to pay a high price for the ¯rm's output.
As a result, a ¯rm of quality lower than q
¤¤
(but not much lower) would have a big incentive to
stretch, in e®ect \free riding" on the high-quality ¯rms' stretching strategy. This is the essence of
the signaling e®ect: the mere fact a ¯rm stretches improves the consumers' assessment of quality.
If we factor in the signaling e®ect, then we get an equilibrium threshold q
¤
(r
0
) that falls be-
low q
¤¤
(r
0
): the signaling e®ect increases the likelihood of stretching. As the level of reputation
increases, q
¤
(r
0
)¡ q
¤¤
(r
0
) tends to zero. The intuition is that, as the level of reputation increases,
the probability of stretching goes to one, and consequently the signaling e®ect becomes less and
less important.
At the equilibrium threshold q
¤
(r
0
) and for a given r
0
, it is the ¯rms with higher q that stretch
(Proposition 2). What about the stretching strategy for a given q? Proposition 3 suggests that, if
± is high enough, then it is the ¯rms with highest r
0
that stretch. Figure 1 shows that this is not
a general result. In fact, for ± =
1
=
2
and for low values of r
0
, q
¤
(r
0
) is increasing. More generally,
q
¤
(r
0
) is increasing if ± is small enough:
Proposition 4 (reputation building). For each r
0
, there exists a ± such that, if ± < ±, then q
¤
(r
0
) is
increasing.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The idea of Proposition 4 is that, if future sales of the base product are su±ciently pro¯table
with respect to the stretched product, then ¯rms should stretch if and only if their reputation is
very low. Even an average quality ¯rm expects that its reputation will improve starting from a
low reputation level: things can only get better. In the short run, stretching implies a lower payo®
than starting a new name; but in the long run, such strategy pays o®.
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That is, in contrast with
the large ± case, the ¯rm's strategy for low ± is one of reputation building. To put it di®erently: If
± is low then the ¯rm stretches only if its quality is very high, that is, the ¯rm follows a strategy
of reputation protection.
19
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Figure 2 illustrates Propositions 3 and 4: it depicts the equilibrium threshold q
¤
(r
0
) for three
di®erent values of ±: 0,
1
=
2
and 1. As suggested by Proposition 3, ± = 1 implies that q
¤
(r
0
) is
decreasing: for a given q, ¯rms stretch if and only if r
0
is greater than the inverse of q
¤
(r
0
). As
suggested by Proposition 4, ± = 0 implies that q
¤
(r
0
) is increasing: for a given q, ¯rms stretch if
and only if r
0
is lower than the inverse of q
¤
(r
0
). For intermediate values of ±, the optimal strategy
may be more complicated. For example, if ± =
1
=
2
and q is one standard deviation below average,
then the optimal strategy is to stretch if r
0
is very low or very high.
5. Discussion
As suggested in the previous sections, there are essentially three e®ects at work in the decision of
stretching a reputation. The feed-back reputation e®ect implies that higher-quality ¯rms are more
con¯dent that stretching will consolidate their reputation. As a result, for a given reputation level,
¯rms with higher quality decide to stretch (Proposition 2).
The direct reputation e®ect implies that ¯rms with higher reputation are able to sell for a
higher price than ¯rms with lower reputation. If the new product is relatively pro¯table compared
to the base product, then ¯rms will \exploit" their reputation, so that, for a given level of quality,
stretching takes place if and only if reputation is su±ciently high (Proposition 3). If the new
product is of marginal importance, however, then ¯rms will only stretch if reputation is su±ciently
low, in an attempt to \build" their reputation; by contrast, when reputation is high, ¯rms prefer
to \protect" their reputation (Proposition 4). Finally, because it is the ¯rms of higher quality that
stretch in equilibrium, the mere fact that a ¯rm stretches signals that its quality is relatively high.
Comparison with alternative theories of brand stretching. An alterative signaling
model of reputation stretching is given by Wernerfelt (1988). He assumes that umbrella branding
(an alternative term for brand stretching) is more costly than creating a new brand. This extra
cost allows for a separating equilibrium where a ¯rm umbrella brands if and only if it is a good
type (high quality). This is one of many Bayesian equilibria, but Wernerfelt (1988) shows it is the
only equilibrium that survives the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion. My model di®ers from Wernerfelt
(1988) in several respects. In particular, his result depends on a positive cost of umbrella branding.
By contrast, I assume that brand stretching is cost neutral, that is, the cost of launching a new
product is the same regardless of the name the ¯rm chooses for its new product. Another important
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di®erence is that my result depends (crucially) on a positive correlation of qualities across a ¯rm's
product o®erings, whereas Wernerfelt's does not (cf Wernerfelt, 1986).
Choi's (1998) theory of brand extension (still another term for the same practice) features both
adverse selection and moral hazard. He considers the case when the seller o®ers a series of products
under the same brand name. Each new product is launched at a price that signals its quality. If
consumers expect the product to be of high quality, as is the case with brand-extended products,
then the price distortion necessary to signal quality is lower. If consumers later ¯nd out that the
product is of low quality, then the ¯rm's reputation breaks down and future high-quality launches
will need to be signaled with a large price distortion. Although Choi's model features adverse
selection and signaling, the strategy of brand extension is supported by a moral-hazard equilibrium
in the tradition of the Klein and Le²er (1981) and Shapiro (1983) models.
6. Empirical evidence and empirical implications
Empirical evidence seems to support the model's prediction that bad news in one product lead
consumers to revise their expectations regarding the quality of other products sold under the same
name. For example, Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) ¯nd that a dangerous drug recall by the Food
and Drug Administration lowers the manufacturer's stock price by more than can be attributed
to the lost pro¯ts from the recalled drug. Sullivan (1990) shows that the 1986 sudden-acceleration
incident with the Audi 5000 shrunk the demand for the Audi 5000 and the Audi Quattro as well.
Erdem (1998) estimates positive (if small in magnitude) cross-category e®ects between two oral
hygiene products, toothpaste and toothbrushes.
Proposition 2 also has implications regarding reputation, stretching, and performance. First,
the average performance of ¯rms that stretch is greater than the average performance of ¯rms that
do not. This is so because the probability of stretching is increasing in quality, while performance is
also increasing in quality. The empirical evidence is consistent with a positive correlation between
stretching and performance (cf Court, Leiter and Loch, 1999). However, it is important to notice
that this is a case of correlation, not causality: it is not the case that by stretching ¯rms perform
better; rather, ¯rms that stretch end up doing better. Too often one hears the argument that ¯rms
should stretch as this improves their performance. My results show that this is true for high-quality
¯rms, but not generally.
Another implication is that, if the stretched product is relatively pro¯table (high ±), then the
12
likelihood of stretching is increasing in reputation. This is not an obvious result. In fact, the
probability of stretching conditional on r
0
, P (sjr
0
), is given by
P (sjr
0
) =
R
q
q
¤
(r
0
)
f(r
0
jq) dG(q)
R
q
q
f(r
0
j~q) dG(~q)
: (3)
P (s
0
jr) is increasing in r
0
(by Assumption 1) and decreasing in q
¤
(r
0
). If q
¤
(r
0
) is decreasing, as
is the case when ± is high enough (Proposition 3), then P (sjr
0
) is unambiguously increasing in r
0
.
However, if q
¤
(r
0
) is increasing, as is the case when ± is small, then it is conceivable that P (sjr
0
) is
decreasing in r
0
. As it turns out, in the linear-normal example, P (sjr
0
) is increasing for all values
of ±, but less so for lower values of ±. Speci¯cally,
P (sjr
0
) = 1¡ ©
0
B
B
@
q
¤
(r
0
)¡
¾
2
q
¾
2
q
+¾
2
r
r
0
r
¾
2
q
¾
r
¾
2
q
+¾
2
r
1
C
C
A
;
where © is the standardized-normal cdf. This is illustrated by Figure 3, which plots P (sjr
0
) for
three values of ±. The ¯gure suggests that a regression with P (sjr
0
) as a dependent variable would
show a positive coe±cient in the r
0
¢ ± interaction term.
7. Extensions
The model I have presented is very simple in many respects. For example, I could have considered
more than three periods. Also, instead of assigning all of the market power to the seller, I could
have assumed some sharing with buyers. However, I believe that the main results are robust and
would hold in more general settings as well. In what follows, I speci¯cally consider the robustness
of the model with respect to the assumption that the set of ¯rms developing a new product has
measure zero. I also consider three possible extensions of my basic framework.
Positive probability of new product development. I have considered an overlapping
generations model of three-period lived ¯rms. Firms are endowed with a product in the ¯rst
period. Some ¯rms are also endowed with a second product in the second period. I have assumed
that these ¯rms form a set of measure zero. Suppose however that, independently of q, a ¯rm is
endowed with a second product with probability ®. The equations for the posterior distribution of
q are now more complicated. Speci¯cally, if consumers observe a new product with a new name,
13
they must consider the possibility that this product is being launched by a new ¯rm or by an old
¯rm that decided to create a new name. We thus have, instead of (2)
h(qj
°
/) =
g(q)
³
1 + ®y(q)
´
R
q
q
³
1 + ®y(~q)
´
dG(~q)
;
where
y(q) =
Z
r
r
³
1¡ x(q; r
0
)
´
dF (r
0
jq):
(y(q) is the probability that a ¯rm of quality q does not stretch.)
Likewise, when consumers make a second purchase from a ¯rm that did not stretch, they must
consider the possibility that the ¯rm did not develop a second product or, having developed one,
decided to sell it under a new name. We thus have, instead of (2)
h(qjr
0
) = (1¡ ®)
g(q)f(r
0
jq)
R
q
q
f(r
0
; ~q) dG(~q)
+ ®
g(q)f(r
0
jq)
³
1¡ x(q; r
0
)
´
R
q
q
f(r
0
; ~q)
³
1¡ x(~q; r
0
)
´
dG(~q)
:
(The expressions for h(qjr
0
; s) and h(qjr
0
; s; r
1
) remain unchanged.) Notice that the above ex-
pressions are continuous in ® at ® = 0. Moreover, the proof of Proposition 2 is based on strict
monotonicity with respect to q. Consequently, the same result would follow for small values of ®,
that is, the result is robust to small perturbations in the value of ®.
Imperfect correlation. One interesting question is how the equilibrium strategy depends
on the degree of correlation between the quality of the base product and the quality of the second
product. I conjecture that the lower the degree of correlation between products, the greater the
probability of stretching. The argument runs as follows. Let
¹
S(q; r
0
) be the expected payo® from
stretching given that consumers do not process the information given by the signal that the ¯rm
stretched. (That is, the curve q
¤¤
(r
0
) in Figure 1 corresponds to the condition
¹
S(q
¤¤
(r
0
); r
0
) =
N(r
0
).) Let q
0
be the quality of the second product and ½ an indicator of the correlation between
q and q
0
. Suppose that ½ is common knowledge to ¯rm and consumers; that the ¯rm can only
observe q
0
after it decides whether or not to stretch; and that consumers can never observe q or
q
0
. It seems reasonable to assume that
@
@ ½
¯
¯ ¹
S(q; r
0
; ½)¡N(r
0
)
¯
¯
> 0. In words, the greater the
correlation between q and q
0
, the more important the r
0
news are, both good news and bad news.
Recall that, in equilibrium and for the marginal type q
¤
(r
0
), the positive signaling e®ect exactly
balances a negative reputation e®ect. A greater degree of correlation implies that the reputation
14
e®ect is more negative. In order to compensate for this, the signaling e®ect must also be more
positive, which implies a greater q
¤
.
20
Endogenous choice of correlation. Does the above conjecture imply that we should observe
¯rms stretching mainly into unrelated product lines? Not necessarily. The above conjecture is for
the comparative statics with respect to an exogenous change in ½. But it probably makes more
sense to think of ½ as the result of an endogenous choice by the ¯rm. Also, it seems reasonable to
assume that the cost of stretching is increasing in the degree of correlation: if the ¯rm wants to
choose a product that is very closely correlated to its current o®ering, then it has less to choose
from. A tantalizing possibility is that there exists a separating equilibrium whereby the higher the
quality and/or reputation, the greater the degree of correlation.
Endogenous choice of launching new product. Along the same lines, one could also
endogenize the decision of launching a new product. Suppose that a ¯rm develops a new product,
as in the model above, but then decides whether to launch it (under the same name as the ¯rst
product) or not to launch it at all. Formally, this model is isomorphic to the model in Section 2.
In fact, if w(
°
/) = 0 then we get the same model. The alternative interpretation of the model is
interesting because it dispenses with the assumption of unobservability of brand ownership. We
would then have a model of ¯rm reputation rather than brand reputation; and a theory of how
reputation a®ects the ¯rm's expansion strategy rather than its product naming strategy.
15
Appendix
The proofs of Propositions 1{4 follow.
Proof of Proposition 1. Since in the proposed equilibrium stretching occurs with probability zero
and, for all q and r
0
, f(r
0
jq) > 0, we can assign any posterior belief upon the event of stretching.
Let that belief be that x^(q; r
0
) > 0 if and only if q = q. This induces a posterior distribution H
that is dominated by both G and H(qjr
0
). Since w increases when H increases in the sense of
¯rst-order stochastic dominance, the result follows. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. From (1), we see that the marginal payo® from stretching only depends
on r
1
through the second period payo® in case of stretching. High values of r
1
shift the posterior
distribution of q in the direction of ¯rst-order stochastic dominance; that is, high values of r
1
are
good news. It follows that the realized marginal payo® from stretching is strictly increasing in r
1
.
Assumption 1 then implies that M(q; r
0
) is strictly increasing in q. In fact, other than through r
1
,
M(q; r
0
) does not depend on q. Finally, the fact that M(q; r
0
) is strictly increasing in q implies
that the equilibrium strategy must be
x(q; r
0
) =
(
1 if q > q
¤
(r
0
)
0 otherwise
To show that there exists a unique q
¤
(r
0
), suppose there exist two equilibria identi¯ed by the
functions q
¤
L
(r
0
) and q
¤
H
(r
0
), where q
¤
L
(r
0
) < q
¤
H
(r
0
). Also, let M
L
(q; r) and M
H
(q; r) be the
marginal bene¯t from stretching given that consumers hold beliefs corresponding to q
¤
L
(r
0
) and
q
¤
H
(r
0
), respectively. Consider the following result, the proof of which is obtained by straightforward
di®erentiation.
Lemma 1. Suppose that »(xjx^) = Ã(x)=
R
1
x^
Ã(~x) d~x (x > x^) where » and Ã are densities and
x 2 IR. Then »(xjx
0
) dominates »(xjx
00
), in the sense of ¯rst-order stochastic dominance, if and
only if x
0
> x
00
.
This implies that M
L
(q; r) < M
H
(q; r). But then we have a contradiction: 0 = M
L
(q
¤
L
(r
0
); r) <
M
H
(q
¤
L
(r
0
); r) < M
H
(q
¤
H
(r
0
); r) = 0, where the last inequality follows from monotonicity of M (q; r)
16
with respect to q, as shown above.
Finally, we only have to show that the probability of stretching is strictly positive, i.e., q
¤
(r
0
) <
q. In fact, in the limit as q
¤
(r
0
) ! q, both H(qjr
0
; s) and H(qjr
0
; s; r
1
) dominate H(qj
°
/) and
H(qjr
0
) (in the sense of ¯rst-order stochastic dominance). Since M(q; r
0
) is increasing in q and the
belief q
¤
(r
0
), it follows that the marginal ¯rm's payo® is positive for su±ciently high q
¤
(r
0
). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. For ± large enough, the comparison between stretching and not stretch-
ing corresponds to the comparison between w(r
0
; s) and w(
°
/), the ¯rm's unit pro¯t at age one
depending on whether it stretches or does not, respectively. In the limit when ± = 1, we have
S(q; r
0
) = w(r
0
; s) =
R
q
q
¤
f(r
0
jq) v(q) dG(q)
R
q
q
¤
f(r
0
j~q) dG(~q)
N(r
0
) = w(
°
/) =
Z
q
q
v(q) dG(q):
The indi®erent type q
¤
(r
0
) is therefore determined by
R
q
q
¤
f(r
0
jq) v(q) dG(q)
R
q
q
¤
f(r
0
j~q) dG(~q)
¡
Z
q
q
v(q) dG(q) = 0:
Assumption 1 implies that v(q) is strictly increasing. Assumption 1 and the fact that v(q) is strictly
increasing imply that the left-hand side is strictly increasing in r
0
. Lemma 1 and the fact that v(q)
is strictly increasing imply that the left-hand side is strictly increasing in q
¤
. The result then follows
from the implicit function theorem and continuity in ±. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. In the limit when ± = 0, the condition for the indi®erent type q
¤
(r
0
) is
given by
Z
r
r
w(r; s; r
1
) dF (r
1
jq
¤
)¡ w(r
0
) = 0:
By the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 2, the left-hand side is strictly increasing in
q
¤
. I will now argue that, under Assumptions 2{3, the left-hand side is deceasing in r
0
.
Assumption 3 (normality) implies that the posterior distribution of q given a signal r
0
is normal
with mean
¾
2
q
r
¾
2
q
+¾
2
r
and variance
¾
2
q
¾
2
r
¾
2
q
+¾
2
r
; and the posterior distribution of q given signals r
0
; r
1
is
17
normal with mean
¾
2
q
(r
0
+r
1
)
2¾
2
q
+¾
2
r
and variance
¾
2
q
¾
2
r
2¾
2
q
+¾
2
r
. Assumption 2 (linearity) implies that consumers
only care about the expected value of q. Moreover, it is known that, if q » N(¹; ¾), then the
expected value of q given that q > q
¤
is equal to ¹ + ¾
2
Z
³
q
¤
¡¹
¾
´
, where Z(x) =
Á(x)
1¡©(x)
is the
standardized-normal hazard rate (i.e., Á(x) and ©(x) are the standardized normal density and cdf,
respectively). Finally, Z(x) is strictly increasing.
Together, these facts imply that the above equation can be rewritten as
¾
2
q
2¾
2
q
+ ¾
2
r
(r
0
+ q
¤
) +
¾
2
q
¾
2
r
2¾
2
q
+ ¾
2
r
Z
+1
¡1
Z
0
B
B
@
q
¤
¡
¾
2
q
2¾
2
q
+¾
2
r
(r
0
+ r
1
)
r
¾
2
q
¾
2
r
2¾
2
q
+¾
2
r
1
C
C
A
dF (r
1
jq
¤
)¡
¾
2
q
¾
2
q
+ ¾
2
r
r
0
= 0:
Straightforward computation shows that, since Z(x) is strictly increasing, the left-hand side is
strictly decreasing in r
0
. The result then follows from the implicit function theorem and continuity
in ±. Q.E.D.
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Notes
1. As the Economist argues (July 2nd, 1994), \brands are created because buyers crave information.
They see a huge range of products that look the same and seem to perform similar. Brands o®er
a route through the confusion."
2. Throughout most of the paper, I assume that reputation is associated to the ¯rm's brand name.
Strictly speaking, the model is one of brand stretching. However, the model can also be interpreted
as depicting the decision of stretching a ¯rm's reputation. In this case, the decision would be to
sell a second product versus to create a new ¯rm to sell the new product. More on this later.
3. In this paper, I will only consider brands as vehicles of information. An alternative approach is
to assume that brands have an intrinsic value. See Pepall and Richards (2000) for an analysis of
brand stretching in this context.
4. Actually, Choi's (1998) model features both moral hazard and adverse selection. I will return to
this paper later. Other papers that take the moral-hazard approach to explain brand stretching
include Andersson (1998) and Cabral (2000).
5. I could also assume sales of the base product at age 1, but this would unnecessarily make the model
more cumbersome.
6. The assumption that only a countable set of ¯rms develop a second product greatly simpli¯es the
analysis. However, the qualitative results of the paper would still hold if I assumed a small, strictly
positive probability of new product development. See Section 7.
7. The same qualitative results go through if the correlation between quality levels is positive and
su±ciently high.
8. The model can either be interpreted as one where ¯rms sell one unit per period or, alternatively, a
continuum of units that perform equally (e.g., a production batch).
20
9. Later in the paper I relax this assumption, as well as the assumption of perfect correlation of
product quality.
10. Strictly speaking, − should explicitly include the information that the ¯rm did not stretch. How-
ever, given my assumption that the measure of ¯rms that develop a second product is zero, the
information that the ¯rm does not stretch is irrelevant.
11. As we will see, in equilibrium x(q; r
0
) is either zero or one, but pure strategies are a derived, not
assumed, result.
12. The assumption that consumers bid for each ¯rm's output allows me to set aside the question of
signaling through prices and instead focus on the ¯rm's decision of naming its second product.
13. For a ¯rm not endowed with a second product, the items under a = 1 do not apply and the analysis
is trivial as such ¯rm has no decisions to make.
14. See Section 7 for a discussion of how to relax this assumption.
15. It is also the only equilibrium that survives the Fudenberg-Tirole (1991) version of D1, though it
is generally not the unique divine equilibrium.
16. Straightforward computation shows that Assumption 3 is consistent with Assumption 1.
17. Details of the computation are available upon request. Some of the details are included in the proof
of Proposition 4 below.
18. An implicit assumption of my analysis is that ¯rms cannot change the name of their existing
product. In fact, all I need to assume is that consumers are able to identify the product even if the
¯rm changes its name.
19. Dranove and Tan (1990) show that information spillovers may lead an incumbent to be over-
conservative in its decision to enter a new market: by doing so, the incumbent's true ability (e.g.,
21
quality) may be revealed and induce entry into the base market.
20. The exact statement would then be: for a given r
0
, the higher ½ is, the higher the threshold q
¤
(r
0
)
above which ¯rms stretch.
22
Table 1: Timing
a = 0 Firm is born and endowed with quality q.
Consumers buy one unit and observe performance r
0
, drawn from F (r
0
jq).
a = 1 Firm sells second product under the same name with probability x(q; r
0
).
Consumers buy one unit of second product and observe performance r
1
, drawn from
F (r
1
jq).
a = 2 Consumers buy one unit of ¯rst product.
Table 2: Notation.
q ¯rm quality
r
t
product performance in period t
s event of stretching
± relative size of new product (with respect to base product)
u(r) consumer utility given performance
v(q) consumer indirect expected utility given quality
w(H) consumer willingness to pay given belief H about quality
x(q; r) probability of stretching
− consumer's information set
F (rjq) probability distribution of performance given quality (density f)
G(q) prior distribution of quality (density g)
H(qj−) posterior distribution of quality (density h)
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0-4 -3 -2 -1 1 2
1
¡1
¡2
q
r
q
¤
(r
0
)
q
¤¤
(r
0
)
Equilibrium when F and G are Normal (¾
q
= ¾
r
= 1).
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± = 0
Equilibrium threshold q
¤
(r
0
) as a function of ±, the relative weight of the stretched product
(¾
q
= ¾
r
= 1).
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Probability of stretching conditional on reputation, for di®erent values of ± (¾
q
= ¾
r
= 1).
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